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Abstract
Conceptual consequences of recent results in loop quantum gravity are collected
and discussed here in view of their implications for a modern philosophy of sci-
ence which is mainly understood as one that totalizes scientific insight so as to
eventually achieve a consistent model of what may be called „fundamental heu-
ristics“ on an onto-epistemic background which is part of recently proposed
transcendental materialism. This enterprise is being understood as a serious at-
tempt of answering recent appeals to philosophy so as to provide a conceptual
foundation for what is going on in modern physics, and of bridging the obvious
gap between physics and philosophy. This present first part of the paper deals
with foundational aspects of this enterprise, a second part will deal with its holi-
stic aspects.
Preliminary Statement
In his report on the 13th International Congress on Mathematical Physics
(icmp2000) at Imperial College London, Abhay Ashtekar formulates: „In the
quantum gravity [contributed] session, while the first two talks were on „stan-
dard“ mathematical physics topics on the interface of general relativity and
quantum physics, the last two were on the interface between quantum gravity,
philosophy of science and quantum computing. Unfortunately, this attempt to
broaden [sic] and reach out to neighboring field[s] did not succeed; there was a
marked difference in the level of precision and emphasis between the two sets of
talks.“ [In: http://gravity.phys.psu.edu/mog/mog16/node13.html] He forgot to tell that he him-
self as the session’s chairman found it necessary at the time to explicitly stress
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this „reaching out“ to other fields twice, namely at the very beginning of the ses-
sion and immediately before the first talk of the second half. And this announ-
cement was made in such an apologetic tone that it was clearly signalled to most
of the audience that now would come the right moment for a little nap. In fact,
the announcement could well be read as some sort of excuse for having been
forced to take on these two talks despite being chairman. The reaction was
equally obvious and clear, particularly among the younger colleagues who still
believe in authority rather than in their own critical abilities. (Letting aside the
fact that the available time for the talks was decisively shortened without prior
notice and one of the overhead projectors broke down -  i.e., that the session was
not very well organized anyway.) So this attempt could hardly be called an ex-
periment. Instead, one should call it a self-fulfilling prophecy. The question is
whether it is really useful (and serves the purpose) to define everything that is
being done by one group of people (let us call it the Pittsburgh group) as an
advancement of the desired interaction between physics and philosophy, and to
negate alternative approaches without actually discussing them at all. Precision
and emphasis are aspects which have to be cleared within a framework of open
communication, not by means of self-defined verdicts. At least, so is the custom
in European continental philosophy.
Introduction
It has been shown at other occasions [6] that recent results of modern physics
can be used to shed some more light onto the foundations of the world, provided
the actual task of philosophy is being re-interpreted in terms of a theory which is
following up the results of science rather than laying the grounds for the latter,
contrary to what the original intention of Aristotelian prima philosophia would
imply. As it turns out, the interpretation of the main results of present research
dealing with aspects of quantum information theory and quantum gravity, re-
spectively, as well as with self-organized criticality, suffices to re-construct a
large class of phenomena not only within the field of physics proper, but also
within chemistry, biology, and even the social sciences.
As seen under a philosophical perspective, it can be shown that the general con-
ceptualization of such a unified view of the world has been prepared on a long
line of thought which begins with the Greek Stoá and leads up to the theories of
Spinoza, Schelling and Bloch as some of its representatives, eventually showing
up in a somewhat modified form in what can be called transcendental materia-
lism today. ([6], reference 5) As seen under the physical perspective however, it
can be demonstrated how a philosophy re-interpreted in the above-mentioned
sense can unfold a heuristic potential which is able to produce guidelines of ori-
entation as to deciding about competing concepts in physics. Such a function of
philosophy has often been asked for, but has rarely been realized so far when
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there actually was one of the few occasions to explicitly deal with it in detail.
One problem of this is to sort out what would be the appropriate philosophical
approach to pertinent questions, in the first place. In the present paper we shall
try to contribute somewhat to a further clarification.
This unsatisfactory development of the past has its reasons, of course. In parti-
cular, the more recent philosophy of the 20th century, after world war II, has mo-
re or less completely suppressed the line of thinking which has been mentioned
above, essentially in favour of a self-centring discussion of philosophy itself,
taking its label for its contents. This is due to the neo-Kantian effort dating back
to the 19th century, to eventually establish a new, formal unity of the sciences,
philosophy, the arts, and religion. Although this mainly apologetic enterprise has
been subject to failure from the beginning on, it is nevertheless determining Eu-
ropean continental (and in particular German) philosophy still today by its two
basic components of activities: the history of philosophy on the one hand and
the foundations of concepts on the other. Concrete praxis then, shows up only in
terms of a developmental history of thinking, divorced from any practical relati-
onship to worldliness and empirical existence – being enshrined in a kind of
„pure motion of thoughts“ which has lost already sight of the world of everyday
life, of the socially mediated and politically active human being. Hence, the hi-
story of philosophy is very often mixed up with philosophy proper, the practise
of doing history with actual philosophizing. And concentrating on the motion of
thoughts means to actually forget about what these thoughts actually do reflect
at all – thinking all the time, uncorrectly though, that the latter would not be im-
portant, once the mechanism of relexion itself would have been uncovered. This
view is also supported, though from another perspective, by analytic philosophy
which dominates the Anglo-Saxon countries. Here also, the systematization of
thinking is more important than that about which thinking actually thinks. Mo-
reover, it is assumed, also uncorrectly, that what is being thought can always be
said, thus denying the necessity for any hermeneutic which is surpassing formal
logic.
At the same time, this ideological tendency serves also a much more personal
interest, namely one which aims at the securing of an isolated field of discourse
which is exclusively reserved for the philosophical discourse alone. This has be-
come very obvious in the recently emerged field of „cognitive science“, where
each explicitly materialistic model is being rejected from the outset by this
„philosophical lobby“, based on the false premise of indicating that this would
be nothing than late relics of the mechanical materialism of the 19th century, and
a primarily reductionistic effort with the objective of eventually taking over
philosophy in merely scientific terms. However, keeping to this false premise
means to forget about the fact that a philosophy which can be understood in
terms of a dialectical and transcendental materialism visualized within a modern
perspective is nothing but the result of critically reflecting recently gained in-
sight in the various fields of science. In other words: only such an approach can
be called practical in the first place.
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But although being oriented with a view to the sciences, philosophy is not at all
duplicating the latter’s work. Contrary to that, philosophizing means primarily to
critically reflect each single sector of the uncovered worldliness with a view to
the global interrelationships among all possible sectors, to ask for necessary and
sufficient conditions for the main structural aspects of single sectors, and for
possible alternatives. In this sense, philosophical reflexion gains more and more
a heuristic connotation: The unification of the scientifically (necessary) seg-
mented actuality is no self-purpose therefore: On the contrary, the important
point is to show, within all what is empirically observable, what is not more
subject of science.
In the following we discuss the foundation of the physical world in terms of re-
cent progress made in the understanding of the concept of spin networks. (sec-
tion 1) We try to clarify the concept of „foundation“ itself, and come to a con-
ceptual conclusion which is somewhat different from the common utilization of
this concept in physics. Subsequently, in an attempt of introducing the notion of
downward and upward causation, we deal with aspects of quantum computation,
and with the concepts of loops and knots. (sections 2 and 3) The idea is to find a
common basis for building and re-tracing a hierarchy of modelling the actuality
of the world as a progressive evolution towards increasing complexity. Hence,
both the approach of topological quantum field theory (section 4), and the con-
ception of self-organized criticality (section 5), will be helpful in order to de-
scribe the explicitly dynamical architecture of this modelling. Smolin’s principle
of cosmic selection (section 6) will add some more insight into this, if being vi-
sualized in a somewhat modified way. The forthcoming second part of this pre-
sent paper will deal with a possible generalization of this approach trying to re-
ach out into regions beyond physics, hence trying to „climb“ the hierarchy of
wordly structures.
1 Spin Networks & Spin Foams
Recall that essentially, spin networks in the sense of Penrose [1] are coloured
graphs, i.e. trivalent graphs with edges labelled by spins. More generally, the
edges can be thought of as being labelled by group representations and the ver-
tices as being labelled by intertwining operators. For the case that the respective
group is SU(2) and the graph is trivalent, the original form of a spin network
emerges. As Baez has shown in some detail for the simplified case of BF theory
[2], the full development of the basic ideas about spin networks is comparatively
straightforward, if visualized within the context of loop quantum gravity. The
two crucial innovations of the latter are first its insistence on a background-free
approach to gravity and second that it uses a formulation of Einstein’s equations
in which – similar to gauge theory in general – parallel transport rather than the
metric is important. Spin networks fit generically into this framework. The im-
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portant result is that the elementary excitations as represented in terms of Hilbert
space terminology (in fact, originating from the quantizing of cotangent bundles
associated with a suitable space of connections) turn out to be spin network ed-
ges of dimension one. [3] This leads straightforwardly to spin foams as a two-
dimensional replacement of one-dimensional Feynman diagrams: A spin foam
shows up as a two-dimensional complex built from vertices, edges, and polygo-
nal faces. The edges are labelled by intertwining operators, the faces by group
representations. The idea of spin foams is to work with path integrals that can be
understood as analogues of the afore-mentioned Feynman diagrams. Conse-
quently, a generic slice of a spin foam is a spin network. The motivation for this
comes mainly from the problem that, as Baez notes, „[w]hile Penrose originally
intended for spin networks to describe the geometry of space-time, they are re-
ally better for describing the geometry of space.“ ([2], p.2) The dynamics (ente-
ring via the Hamiltonian constraint) is practically absent. So that the necessity
arises to introduce the „evolutionary“ aspect in terms of some path integral for-
malism or of something which „sums over states“ (the latter given by means of
spin networks). This refers mainly to the work of Rovelli and Smolin [4] who
for the first time replaced the original spin networks by „embedded spin net-
works“, i.e. usual spin networks plus an immersion of their graphs into a three-
dimensional manifold, calling equivalence classes of spin networks under dif-
feomorphisms s-knots. These do not live on a manifold, i.e. they are not located
somewhere, but they actually are this somewhere. Since spin network states of
type <Sspan the loop state space, one can see that any ket state ψ> is uniquely
determined by the values of the <Sfunctionals on it:
ψ(S) := <Sψ>.
In this sense, a quantum state of the geometry of space is being described by a
linear combination of spin networks. Areas and volumes take on a discrete
spectrum of quantized values. And the transition amplitudes between states are
computed as sums over spin foams. Hence, spin network states show up as ele-
mentary quantum excitations of the gravitational field carrying quanta of volume
at their vertices (nodes) and quanta of area on their edges (links).
There is however (beside technical aspects), a conceptual problem to this: The
point is that as loop quantum gravity is primarily based on canonical quantizati-
on, a concept of „fixed background time“ is necessary in order to describe a
state (of the geometry). This means that it is not so clear what a „generic slice“
(of a spin foam) should actually be. In other words: What would be a „natural
time distance“ or „lapse“ between spin network states? [5] On the other hand,
this touches a more critical question, namely: „How fundamental is ‚fundamen-
tal‘?“ As it turns out, the expression „fundamental“ is utilized differently, in
physics, and in philosophy. This can be seen as follows:
As quoted already, Baez refers to Penrose stating that he „intended for spin net-
works to describe the geometry of space-time.“ And he explicitly formulates:
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„Spin networks were first introduced by Penrose as a radical, purely combinato-
rial description of the geometry of spacetime.“ ([2], pp.1-2, emphasis mine) As
it appears, this is not quite true: Because Penrose derives his original idea from
the fact that physics plays in two different „worlds“, the continuous space of ge-
neral relativity (a Lorentz manifold of dim = 4 and sign =  – 2) on the one hand,
and the space of quantum theory (a Hilbert manifold of high (or infinite) dimen-
sion and positive-definite sign) on the other. Assuming that a unification of both
within the (physical) world would not be possible, his idea is to „build up both
space-time and quantum mechanics simultaneously – from combinatorial prin-
ciples – ...“ ([1], p.151) Hence, what he does is to actually leave the physical
world in a conceptual sense in order to start from an abstract structure from
which spacetime could be eventually derived. In other words: This structure ta-
kes the (philosophical) connotation of a substance in the traditional metaphysi-
cal sense, referring to something which is beyond the world (beyond space and
time that is) while spacetime as it is topic of both the theory of general relativity
and of quantum theory is visualized under two different aspects of the same un-
derlying entity, hence as attributes of that substance. The difficulty of actually
performing this task of describing such an abstract structure (be it in mathemati-
cal, physical, or philosophical terms) is in the fact that space and time cannot be
excluded from this conceptual discussion from the outset, because of epistemo-
logical reasons: we use them as the very categories of thinking. There is no way
to express what we think otherwise than by means of (propositional) language.
And languages (at least those of European descent) utilize explicitly space and
time categories from which they derive their lexicology, syntax, and semantics.
Hence, the conceptual emergence of 3-space as described in this early paper by
Penrose refers to the process of thinking, i.e. to emergence in epistemological
terms, rather than to a physical process, i.e. to emergence in ontological terms.
The point is that we have to model the emergence of spacetime according to our
available language (i.e. modaliter), while „in reality“ (i.e. realiter), the combi-
natorial structure as introduced by Penrose is permanently underlying all what
there is. In this sense, it is referred to as being fundamental. Therefore, general
relativity actually describes spacetime as we can visualize it in classical terms
when modelling it according to Einstein’s theory based on empirical (i.e. obser-
vable and perceivable) aspects of the physical world. But spin networks as a
combinatorial, abstract structure, serve to visualize an underlying entity we can-
not actually perceive at all. In a (meta-theoretical) way, general relativity is a
concrete model of the Universe, spin network theory is an abstract model of the
foundation of the Universe. The difference between the former and quantum
theory is simply that in the case of quantum theory, it is not so easy to differ
between its empirically accessible parts and its purely interpretational parts. It is
comparatively easy to recognize this conceptual problem as the ancient problem
of the relationship between substance and attribute. [6]
This means that the original question („How fundamental is ‚fundamental‘?“)
points to a conceptual (and thus philosophical) gap between the physical world
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and its foundation: Indeed, within the recent approach, spin networks serve to
quantize space and determine the „boundary“ of the Planck scale. When discus-
sing flux lines of a gravitational field piercing black hole horizons and exciting
curvature degrees of freedom on the surfaces, Ashtekar and Krasnov can visua-
lize each micro-state as an elementary bit of information. [7] But if there ac-
tually are quanta of space (and time), then there are space and time. (And not
their foundations.) And if these quanta refer to bits, they refer to classical infor-
mation, not to quantum information. In fact, Wheeler’s conception of „It from
Bit“ (mentioned by Ashtekar and Krasnov) has to be replaced now by a more
subtle conception of „It from Qubit“. ([8], p.47)
But, even if so, the question is also whether it is possible to continue modelling
the foundation (i.e. the truly fundamental level of physics) by utilizing classical
concepts such as space, time, and even causality (indicating proper light cone
structures). Because this would be then something outside the Universe. (As
Schelling once formulated a long time ago: „ ... foundation is against that to
which it is foundation, non-being.“ [9], p.440) This obviously speaks against a
path integral approach, at least on the really fundamental level. A similar argu-
ment has been formulated earlier by Crane. [10] Therefore, the more recent ap-
proaches by Barrett and Crane put the emphasis on algebraic and categorial as-
pects of the theory, and mainly on topological quantum field theories. [11] On
the other hand, very rarely, the substance-attribute relationship is even men-
tioned when talking about quantum gravity, but then only in passing: „We har-
bour no illusion that such traditional philosophical ideas are likely to be heuristi-
cally helpful, let alone a prerequisite, for theory-construction.“ ([12], p.40)
Strong words indeed! Indicating that everything would have been tried before,
and one would really know about substance. But this is not quite the case, be-
cause the knowledge among physicists – and analytical philosophers – of mo-
dern interpretations of Spinoza’s substance metaphysics is not only limited, but
practically absent, as can be empirically demonstrated even among those (few)
who deal seriously with metaphysics at all. Even the relationship between Leib-
nizian and Spinozist theory is not well understood. Hence, what we can state is
the following:
All of this uncovers the fact that the term „fundamental“ is usually utilized for
the „boundary“ region of spacetime rather than for the truly fundamental level of
consideration. Within the picture of loop quantum gravity, this boundary region
is constituted by means of spin networks which define the „lowest level“ of
(quanta of) space. Re-reading a famous passage of Rovelli’s can clarify what is
being meant with „fundamental“: There is an obvious contradiction between the
proposition that „[w]e know that there is a regime in which all present funda-
mental theories break down“, and the proposition that „[i]n a sense, ‚there is no
time‘ at the fundamental level.“ ([13], pp.207, 213) Because in the former case,
there are no fundamental theories in this sense: It may be (or rather: it is likely)
that Einstein has visualized his theory as fundamental when thinking of geome-
try as being substance, but the advent of quantum theory has destroyed this ho-
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pe. ([6], reference 6) On the other hand, quantum theory for itself is not funda-
mental enough, as the role of gravitation within attempted TOEs seems to indi-
cate. Note that most approaches in quantum theory deal with an interpretation of
the theory in its traditional form as it has been handed down to us from the times
of Schroedinger and Heisenberg. There is hardly any reference in this as to the
role of gravity. On the really fundamental level however, there is no space and
no time at all, be it quantized or not. So the real problem is to think the foundati-
on of the world in a way which marks clearly its categorial difference from the
world itself, and then to re-construct the transition from this fundamental level
to the boundary of (quantized) world.
Such an approach is the only possibility to actually avoid the „ontological va-
gueness“ Goldstein and Teufel noted recently. ([14], p.276) They actually
discuss the Bohmian approach. But their statement, that „[t]he unobserved phy-
sical reality becomes drastically different from the observed, even on the
macroscopic level of daily life“ ([14], p.281), originally thought of as criticizing
„classical“ quantum theory, takes on a completely new connotation now, if vi-
sualized within the framework of what we have discussed so far. Because in-
deed, there would be two practically disjoint regions now: the (physical) domain
of what can be observed in principle, and the (fundamental) domain of what
cannot be observed in principle. This is not quite in the pure tradition of physics,
but we would not like to join in the stating of a theory being „scientific“ depen-
dent on the question whether there are empirical data available or not, contrary
to current opinion. (Cf. [12], p.36) The point is simply that any TOE has to co-
ver parts of reality (i.e. has to talk about them in propositional terms) which are
not accessible to measurement in principle. Nevertheless, one would call it a
scientific theory. This is not really a new insight. (Cf. [13], p.191) But this is
also the place where modern philosophy actually enters the discussion. Because
it is its genuine task to actually deal with this transition between foundation and
world (possibility and actuality). [15] So instead of simply appealing all the time
to philosophy ([13], p.182), or of listing problems that might be topics of philo-
sophy ([14], p. 279sqq.), physicists should by now take some advice from a field
which has cultivated consistent, systematic, and logical, if not mathematical
thinking for a long time. In fact, it can be shown that quite a long time ago,
within the period of Italian Renaissance, the introduction of mathematical argu-
mentation into science, explicitly cultivated by physicists nowadays, corre-
sponds to a somewhat clandestine re-introduction of previously criticized sub-
stance into the constitution of world views. ([16], p.181sq.)
So there are in fact precise though heuristic results as offered by philosophical
insight: One point is the absence of causality on the truly fundamental level of
physics. Another point is the possible relevance as to the explicit difference of
the Leibnizian model (favoured by present physics as far as it is interested in
philosophical conceptualization) as compared to the Spinozist approach.
As to the first we have to ask whether the re-conceptualization of spin networks
in the sense of Penrose is not unwillingly falling back behind the original com-
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binatorial insight gained: namely to derive spacetime from a purely combinato-
rial structure. Smolin admits that spin network states as they are introduced now
„are not purely combinatorial objects“ ([17], p.7), they actually show up as „a
mixture of combinatorial spin networks, causal sets, and critical behaviour mo-
dels.“ ([18], p.3, emphasis mine) Hence, the second is being „put in by hand“,
the third is referring to self-organized criticality in the sense of the Santa Fe
school (which might turn out to be independent of a substratum). This strategy
of building in causality from the outset is put forward in a large number of pa-
pers. [19] However, the problem is in the transition from combinatorial to spatial
and temporal structures: The causal sets showing up in the functor Past refer to
events which are ill-defined on the fundamental level. (Without space and time
one would not know what an event actually is.) And the causal history is defined
as a succession (or even recursion) of Pachner moves which are essentially local
unitary operators. Hence, the formulation of an amplitude for going from net-
work 1 to network 2 in the well-known form of
A(1→2) = ∑ (histories 1→2) Π (moves per history) Amove
as a sum-over-histories. But this approach appears to be somewhat unsatisfacto-
ry, because we essentially talk about combinatorial moves. And the question
„How much time needs a Pachner move?“ is probably as difficult to answer as
the question „How much time needs a Reidemeister move?“. [20] The problem
is similar to that of spin foams when talking about a „generic slice“ and the ap-
propriate „lapse“. If the „time step“ is in the tetrahedra of the triangulating con-
struction [21], can this then be rephrased in terms of some tp which generically
accompanies lp? This is not the idea of Penrose though: „The final theory that
emerges must have a fundamentally non-local character.“ ([22], p.424) And we
can add: „ ... must be a-temporal therefore.“
The other point is a little more involved, but basically on the same line of argu-
ment: The main difference between the Leibnizian and Spinozist concepts of
space is that Leibniz explains away space and ends up with objects only such
that space shows up as a cognitive approximation of the set of relationships
among them. Spinoza on the other hand, explains away objects and stays with
the spatial region alone. For him, objects show up as a cognitive approximation
of the fact that some spatial region is object-like (we observe a pebble, because
space is pebbly in some region). [6] In terms of Einstein’s diffeomorphism inva-
riance, these two views seem to be equivalent (if actually visualizing space as a
set of relationships anyway). However, for Spinoza, space as we know it was
essentially the only attribute of substance. Or more precisely: What humans per-
ceive of space (and call physical space) is what they are capable of perceiving
under the only attribute (res extensa) which falls into their mode of being. The
other attribute (res cogitans) gains by this the connotation of a materialistic deri-
vation, and time shows up as its property. Obviously, what humans perceive of
the attributes cannot be fundamental.
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Both these points, causality being visualized as an emergent rather than a fun-
damental concept, and the Spinozist view, spacetime being self-relational rather
than relational, challenge Smolin’s criteria for a background independent ap-
proach (namely numbers 3, 5 and 6, respectively). [23]
If we are visualizing therefore space quanta in terms of spin network states and
include an intrinsic ordering principle called time (evolution), the largest com-
mon denominator of this consideration might be to view the web of spin net-
works as the „boundary layer“ of worldliness, as the borderline between the
fundamental and the empirical. Hence, it is natural to ask two questions first:
What would come „below“ this boundary level of the world (in terms of spin
networks), and what would come „above“ this level? Some aspects of these que-
stions are being discussed in the next two sections.
2 Downward Causation: Quantum Computation
Note first that when we speak of „causation“ we refer to the consistent unfolding
of our ideas dealing with the re-constructing of hierarchical levels of reasoning
rather than with concrete physical processes. The point is that the quantum le-
gacy stands somewhat against this acquired consistency, because its characteri-
stic aspects tend to counteract rational assumptions. This can be clearly seen
with respect to the concept of time: Recall Feynman’s famous „integral argu-
ment“ in favour of visualizing the Universe as a quantum computer. Then, the
integral of the celebrated form,
P(A→B) = ∫γ exp (iS/h) dΓ2
can be essentially interpreted such that it defines the probability for a physical
system going from some state A into another state B. The idea is that this transi-
tion is actually being performed over all possible paths γ at the same time – but
that we can observe only that path for which δS = 0, and we call this the „classi-
cal path“. However, the action here is simply defined in terms of the usual time
integral of the appropriate Lagrangian,
S = ∫ L dt,
and we wonder what the usual time is actually meaning on this fundamental
level, where transitions take many ways at the same time. (This problem is of
course the same for utilizing the time-dependent Schroedinger equation even if
talking of unitary transformations. Indirectly, this also causes the interpretational
difficulties of the Hamiltonian constraint.) ([14], p.279)
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On the other hand, leaving the classical time parameter aside for a moment, the
„computer paradigm“ is plausible in the first place, provided some discrete
computing algorithm can be found of which space and time turn out to be the
classical approximation. Intuitively, it is the spin networks themselves that can
be offered as a fundamental sort of „information channel“, their web structure
constituting a „cosmic internet“ of very basic kind, possibly in the recently pro-
posed sense of Zizzi. [24] There is an alternative approach to computing net-
works of this kind by Hitchcock. [25] In principle, this universal computer can
be visualized then as analogy of a system which percolates information through
available sites of a cellular (automaton) structure. This sort of model has been
mentioned several times before. [26]
But there is another point to that: In the approach of Barrett and Crane, the idea
is to generalize topological state sum models in passing from three to four di-
mensions by replacing the characteristic SO(3) group with SO(4), or its appro-
priate spin covering, SU(2) x SU(2), respectively. [11] The concept of spin net-
works is also generalized then, by introducing graphs with edges labelled by
non-negative real numbers (called „relativistic spin networks“). Applying this
kind of „spin foam“ model to Lorentzian state sums demonstrates their finite-
ness in turn implying a number of choices made from physical and/or geometri-
cal arguments. [27] The really interesting aspect of this is its relation to the
group SL(2,C): because this is the double cover of SO(3,1) and the complexifi-
cation of SU(2) which in turn is the double cover of SO(3). On the other hand,
SL(2,C) is the group of linear transformations of C2 that preserve the volume
form. Thanks to an e-mail crash course on these matters referring to the Barrett-
Crane model and made available online by John Baez and Dan Christensen [28],
where they use the terminology of the former’s quantum gravity seminar [29], it
is easy to understand that constructions in the sense of Barrett-Crane turn out to
be invariant under SL(2,C). In other words, we essentially deal with states in C2
which are spinors. And it is from quantum theory and special relativity that we
know about their relevance. [30] On the other hand, as Baez notes, and as we
will see shortly, a state in C2 can also be called a qubit. So „[w]hat we [a]re re-
ally doing, from the latter viewpoint, is writing down ‚quantum logic gates‘
which manipulate qubits in an SU(2)-invariant [in fact, SL(2,C)-invariant] way.
We [a]re seeing how to build little Lorentz-invariant quantum computers. From
this viewpoint, what the Barrett-Crane model does is to build a theory of quan-
tum gravity out of these little Planck-scale quantum computers.“ ([28], p.42)
This is obviously very much on line with the arguments of Zizzi, Hitchcock,
Lloyd and others. ([8], [24] – [26]) Moreover, it is referring to the explicit level
of spin networks: That is, the aforementioned „boundary layer“ between the
physical world and its foundation shows up as a „shift of quantum computing“
processsing the fundamental information necessary for performing the transition
from foundation to world (or in other words: for actually producing a world out
of its foundation).
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Note however that consequently, when we are dealing with quantum computati-
on, we are still talking about this boundary layer, not yet about the foundation
itself. Because what we encounter when talking about time, we also encounter
when thinking of linearity: the quantum legacy again. This means that the com-
putational base pair leads naturally to a definition of a qubit state as a vector in a
two-dimensional complex vector space with inner product such that a normali-
zed vector can be represented by an expression of the form
α0> + β1>;  α, β∈C,
such that
α2 + β2 = 1.
The collection of n such qubits is a quantum register (of size n); and a quantum
logic gate is simply a device which performs a fixed unitary operation on selec-
ted qubits in a fixed period of time. Hence, a quantum network consists of
quantum logic gates whose computational steps are being synchronized in time
(parallel). The size of the network is equal to the number of gates. Again, what
we see is that the problem is „in the time“ showing up here within the usual fra-
mework of qantum theory. So when looking for an „underlying fundamental
level“ beyond space and time, what we have to do is to step beyond this frame-
work. It will not really help to pass to „entangled qubit states“ (i.e. those which
are non-separable and cannot be written as a tensor product), so long as we defi-
ne quantum computers in terms of a family of quantum networks performing the
activity of quantum computation, and visualizing the latter as a unitary evolution
of these networks. [31] In principle, this context is not being left in all of the
possible applications of entanglement, be it of maximal or mixed-state type.
([32], pp.142, 222) In the end, disentanglement shows up then as an intermediate
state on the way from entanglement towards classicity, but it is not anything
beyond the physicality of the aforementioned „boundary layer“: The use of a
background time analogue (by means of unitary transformations) precludes a
real extension on to a truly fundamental level of modelling.
Another question would be whether the „direction of development“, namely
from entanglement towards disentanglement is actually the correct choice of de-
scribing the onset of classicity. Because, if we remember the phenomenon of
decoherence as a means to produce classicity, then this is basically the result of
entanglement (of qubits with some environment) rather than disentanglement:
(α0> + β1>)m> → α0>m0> + β1>m1>
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such that the density operators are of the form
α2     αβ*             α2             αβ* <m0m1> 
                                              →                                                   ,
α*β      β2             α*β <m1m0>      β2        
and as <m1m0> → 0, „coherences“ vanish. A similar transition we would need
from the foundation onto the „boundary layer“ of (quantum) spin networks. If
we visualize the foundation as a structure without any spatial and temporal con-
notation, but would like to stay with a computational analogue, then we would
think of this sort of „fundamental computational process“ as some kind of fluc-
tuation permanently exchanging spin network states (which themselves serve as
quantum logic gates for quantum computation „on the other side“ of the bounda-
ry layer configuration). But unlike the idea of evolving spin networks in a spin
foam fashion according to some intrinsic time measure defining the generic sli-
ces between spin networks, this fluctuation would be essentially non-local, in
the sense that as seen under the perspective of the foundation, it would be al-
ways and everywhere. (This has been earlier referred to as „intrinsic vibrational
states“ [26], third reference.) If visualized under the classical perspective of a
physical observer within the world however, this fact could only be consistently
conceptualized, if thought of in terms of differentiating spatial and temporal di-
stances, and bringing representations of this kind into some sort of digital suc-
cession. The difficulty of rephrasing such a model utilizing a language which is
basically structured in a spatial and temporal manner, is topic of presently on-
going work. (Cf. [5], first reference) Originally ([26], third reference), it was
thought of utilizing recent insight of Bieberich for this task. [33] This looks still
very promising and is part of the aforementioned project under way.
3 Upward Causation: Wilson Loops & Knots
The other „direction“ of the argument is easier to tackle. This is mainly so be-
cause loops and knots have been discussed in some detail by now. Note that ac-
cording to the standard terminology (we follow here essentially [34]), a loop in
some space Σ, say, is a continuous map γ from the unit interval into Σ such that
γ(0) = γ(1). The set of all such maps will be denoted by ΩΣ, the loop space of Σ.
Given a loop element γ, and a space A of connections, we can define a complex
function on A x ΩΣ, the socalled Wilson loop, such that
TA(γ) := (1/N) TrR P exp ∫γ A.
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Here, the path-ordered exponential of the connection A∈A, along the loop γ, is
also known as the holonomy of A along γ. The holonomy measures the change
undergone by an internal vector when parallel transported along γ. The trace is
taken in the representation R of G (which is the Lie group of Yang-Mills theo-
ry), N being the dimensionality of this representation. The quantity measures
therefore the curvature (or field strength) in a gauge-invariant way. For gravity,
it is more appropriate to choose Wilson loops that are constant along the orbits
of the diffeomorphism action so that
T(ϕ o γ) = T(γ) for all ϕ∈Diff(Σ).
Note that because the original idea of this came from Witten who introduced a
new class of manifold invariants in terms of generalized Feynman integrals, na-
mely of the form,
Z(M) = ∫ dA exp[(ik/4π) S(M, A)],
with M being a 3-manifold without boundary, A the gauge field (connection) on
M, and the action S the integral over M of the trace of the Chern-Simons 3-form,
we are on the „safe side“ here with the path integral formalism, because we are
dealing with the level „above“ the aforementioned „boundary layer“ as repre-
sented by the spin networks themselves. This can be seen as follows: Over a gi-
ven loop γ, the expectation value < T(γ)> turns out to be equal to a knot invariant
(the „Kauffman bracket“) such that when applied to spin networks, the latter
shows up as a deformation of Penrose’s value V(Γ). This is mainly due to the
fact that
< T(γ)> = Kk(γ) = (1/Z) ∫ dµ(A) exp [(ik/4π) S] T(γ, A).
So, for any spin network Γ (replace γ by Γ), the old relation holds up to regula-
rization. Hence, spin networks are deformed into quantum spin networks (which
are essentially given by a family of deformations of the original networks of
Penrose labelled by a deformation parameter q = exp (4π/(k+2)) for the Chern-
Simons case). Note also that the Chern-Simons invariant is important when ha-
ving a non-zero cosmological constant Λ, because there is an exact physical
state of quantum gravity given by ΨCS (A) = exp (k/4π SCS (A)), where k is ac-
tually related to Newton’s constant by G2Λ = 6π/k. This state can be shown to
reproduce Kk(Γ) above.
As Kauffman has shown [35], the condition of being a knot invariant can be
thought of as being equivalent to the diffeomorphism constraint. In particular,
knot states, i.e. loop functionals that depend only on the knotting of the loops,
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can completely solve the diffeomorphism constraint. [36] But then, they are
knotted states of spin networks rather than spin networks themselves, and they
cannot be the true elementary quanta of space. ([36], p.16) They rather depend
on loops as their independent variables. (And in fact, they have non-local de-
pendence on the connection.) ([37], p.63) But as far as all information present in
the holonomy can actually be reconstructed from the Wilson loops, the latter
become fundamental variables in themselves. The point is however, that they
constitute „the worldly side“ of increasing structural complexity. In other words:
They are structurally more complex than (unknotted) spin networks. In this sen-
se, loops can carry diffeomeorphism-invariant information which is not necessa-
rily in their knot-theoretical representation. ([34], p.7) And they can be shown to
solve the Wheeler-deWitt equation, in the first place. ([36], p.16; [38], p.435)
But as to the path integral formalism, we are on the „safe side“, because above
spin network level, we do not have any problems with the reasonable interpreta-
tion of time parameters or similar things.
4 TQFT: Cobordisms & Categories
From here, we can discuss the further unfolding of structure, parallel to results
in topological quantum field theory (TQFT), as discussed for the simplified case
of BF theory. [2] Be A0 the moduli space of flat connections on P, the physical
phase space, and be G  the group of gauge transformations of the bundle P. Re-
call then the definition of a spin foam which is very much alike the one for a
spin network, only one dimension higher. Hence, a spin foam is essentially ta-
king one spin network into another, of the form F: Ψ→Ψ’. Just as spin networks
are designed to merge the concepts of quantum state and geometry of space, spin
foams shall serve the merging of concepts of quantum history and geometry of
space-time. As we have already mentioned, very much like Feynman diagrams
do, also spin foams can be used to evaluate information about the history of a
transition of which the amplitude is being determined. Hence, if Ψ and Ψ’ are
spin networks with underlying graphs γ and γ’, then any spin foam F: Ψ→Ψ’
determines an operator from L2(Aγ /Gγ) to L2(Aγ’ /Gγ’) denoted by O such that
<Φ’, O Φ> = <Φ’, Ψ’><Ψ, Φ>
for any states Φ, Φ’. The evolution operator Z(M) is a linear combination of the-
se operators weighted by the amplitudes Z(O). Obviously, we can define a cate-
gory with spin networks as objects and spin foams as morphisms.
Hence, it turns out, in fact, that L2(A /G) is actually being spanned by spin net-
work states. Call such a state Ψ∈ Fun(A /G) so that any spin network in S ( =
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space) defines such a function. Because Fun is an algebra (namely consisting of
all functions on A of the form Ψ(A) = f(T exp ∫γ1 A ... T exp ∫γn A), where f is a
continuous complex-valued function of finitely many holonomies which are re-
presented here by the integral expressions), multiplication by Ψ defines an ope-
rator on Fun. We call this operator spin network observable.
So what we essentially do is the following: Given the (n-1)-dimensional space S
and a triangulation of S, choose a graph called the dual 1-skeleton. Express any
state in Fun(A /G) as a linear combination of states coming from spin networks
whose underlying graph is this dual 1-skeleton. Define now space-time as a
compact oriented cobordism M: S → S’, where S, S’ are compact oriented mani-
folds of dimension n-1. Choose a triangulation of M such that the triangulations
of S, S’ with dual 1-skeletons γ, γ’ can be determined. The basis for gauge-
invariant Hilbert spaces is given by the respective spin networks. Then the evo-
lution operator Z(M): L2(Aγ/Gγ) → L2(Aγ’/Gγ’) determines transition amplitudes
<Ψ’, Z(M) Ψ> with Ψ, Ψ’ being spin network states. Write the amplitude as a
sum over spin foams from Ψ to Ψ’: < , > = ∑F:Ψ→Ψ’ Z(F) plus composition rules
such that Z(F’) o Z(F) = Z(F’ o F). This is a discrete version of a path integral.
Hence, re-arrangement of spin numbers on the „combinatorial level“ is equiva-
lent to an evolution of states in terms of Hilbert spaces in the „quantum picture“
and effectively changes the topology of space on the „cobordism level“. This
can be understood as a kind of manifold morphogenesis in time: Visualize the n-
dimensional manifold M (with ∂M = S ∪ S’ - disjointly) as M: S → S’, that is as
a process (or as time) passing from S to S’. This is the mentioned cobordism.
Note that composition of cobordisms holds and is associative, but not commuta-
tive. Consequently, these results can also be formulated in the language of cate-
gory theory: As TQFT maps each manifold S representing space to a Hilbert
space Z(S) and each cobordism M: S → S’ representing space-time to an opera-
tor Z(M): Z(S) → Z(S’) such that composition and identities are preserved, this
means that TQFT is a functor Z: nCob → Hilb. Note that the non-commutativity
of operators in quantum theory corresponds to non-commutativity of composing
cobordisms, and adjoint operation in quantum theory turning an operator A: H
→ H’ into A*: H’ → H corresponds to the operation of reversing the roles of
past and future in a cobordism M: S → S’ obtaining M*: S’ → S.
So what we have here in the end, is the structural mediation of the micro-level of
physics with the macro-level of (physical) forms. As re-arrangements of spin
numbers in the combinatorial network correspond to re-arrangements of spatial
quantizations within the triangulation picture, and as both correspond to a
macroscopic evolution of form in terms of spacetime as it can be observed by
some classical observer, this can be visualized as the true onset of a theory of
emergence (once, a generalization beyond BF theory is being achieved).
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5 SOC: The Mediation of Micro & Macro
What TQFT is achieving for the structural mediation, self-organized criticality
(SOC) in the sense of the Santa Fe school is doing for the dynamical mediation
in terms of an explicit transition rule („fourth law stuff“). [39] Stuart Kauffman
starts from the basic idea that the Universe is non-ergodic with respect to its
hierarchical complexity. This is the underlying motivation for assuming the exi-
stence of a „fourth law“ of thermodynamics which actually steers the dynamics
of evolutionary processes. The definition is essentially that a transition (of a gi-
ven physical system) from one state to another is such that it leads into the „ad-
jacent possible“ meaning the set of all possible states for that system which are
one reaction step away from the already actualized states. Hence, compatible
with the principles of self-organized criticality [40], the idea is to base global
outcomes of processes on local interactions. Because this assumption implies
also that the actual flow from the possible to the actual would be such that the
dimensionality of the „adjacent possible“, on average, expands as rapidly as it
can (probably constituting by this an „arrow of time“), the Universe altogether
might tend to flow towards maximal complexity. With a view to percolation
models, Kauffman has, in close cooperation with Smolin, applied these basic
aspects to spin networks themselves. He visualizes them as knotted structures,
and as such as combinatorial objects similar to symbol strings of a grammar,
becoming „collectively autocatalytic“, namely as „knots acting on knots to
create knots in rich coupled cycles not unlike a metabolism.“ ([39], ch.7, p.2)
We will discuss these aspects again in the second part of this present paper. Mo-
re important here for the time being is to notice the basic consequence of such
an approach:
When we try to re-construct the mediation between the micro-level and the
macro-level of the physical world as we can observe it, what we actually do is to
re-construct our own modelling of the world. All what we can do is to model the
world according to what we perceive of it. The set of such models we call
knowledge. [6] At most, we can model the foundation of the world according to
what we know about the world in this sense. Hence, we proceed in a somewhat
transcendental fashion: We permanently ask for the necessary conditions under
which the world exists, given the facts we know about it. But we know before-
hand that the outcome of this must be necessarily incomplete, simply because
our means of perception are incomplete. (They are even incomplete with respect
to what we actually know.) [42]
This basically implies that in principle, there is no chance to eventually com-
plete the information we can extract about the world altogether. Even worse:
According to our own models we can well assume that the lifetime of humans is
finite as compared to the lifetime of the Universe. Hence, there is not even the
chance to eventually develop an all-encompassing „final“ model of our own
component of the world. As I have shown elsewhere in some detail [43], this has
significant ethical implications. (We come to that in the second part of this pre-
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sent paper.) Nevertheless, this incomplete situation for human life is an intrinsic
part of the whole process. It could not be otherwise. Therefore, what humans do
all the time (namely to model their world) has to be visualized as a generic phe-
nomenon of the very process they actually try to model. This is the reason for a
permanent self-reference which is being built in from the beginning into all the
modelling as it is achieved in terms of the various forms of research. In other
words: Developing a structural mediation between micro- and macro-level, and
finding a dynamical rule which generates it, is not only performing the required
re-construction of a permanently becoming knowledge as part of the process of
which it actually is knowledge, in the first place, – and communicating it into
the social collective by means of appropriate semiological techniques –,  it also
is the very process itself. But what we call „process“ in worldly terms, is not a
process at all, if visualized under the perspective of the foundation of the world.
Because in order to define a process we need the adequate categories within
whose framework to phrase the definition. And for us, these are space and time.
So, in the end, we are back to the beginning, and we note the following:
The most we can do is to assume that there actually is something at all, indepen-
dent of human existence. This is a basic ontological statement, and we call it a
statement of „realism.“ But what that something actually is, we cannot know.
We can only model aspects of it. This is the related epistemological statement.
What we have to understand is that these statements do not primarily refer to our
incomplete knowledge, but that instead it is the very tension between the „That“
and the „What“ of existence, which produces our framework of categories, in
the first place. What does that mean in practical terms? It means that what we
can do is to model the world according to the insight gained by developing our
ruling paradigms: A number of centuries ago, it was appropriate to model the
Universe according to the clock paradigm, because the mechanism of the clock
(a first digitalization of some process, by the way) served as an innovative mo-
del for describing organizing processes. Obviously, they were not self-organized
at the time, the existence of some maker of the universal clock being assumed in
the first place. Nowadays, it is more appropriate to model the Universe accor-
ding to the computer paradigm, because it is this technology which has replaced
the classical (and mechanical) technology of a clockwork. And the universal
computer is thought of as being initiated by self-assembly. Hence, the Universe
is visualized as being self-organizing.
Basically therefore, modern substance, as we have seen earlier, can be modelled
according to a universal (quantum) computer. (Provided we do not forget that
this sort of metaphore is referring to the boundary of substance rather.) The me-
diation from spin networks via knotted structures up to macroscopic structures
as performed for a simplified case in terms of topological quantum field theory,
turns out as a specific re-construction fitted to the original paradigm. The same
is true when looking for a dynamical rule which is steering the explicit unfol-
ding of structure. As we will see shortly, we can recover the same aspect again,
when talking about life in the Universe. In fact, the combination of the computer
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paradigm with biological selection is the best we can achieve for the present
modelling of the world.
6 The Cosmic Selection of Life
In this sense, Smolin has introduced a generalized concept of selection by tal-
king about selection of Universes rather than of species. [26] This cosmic selec-
tion rule can be interpreted as the worldly version of the aforementioned „knot
metabolism“ as discussed by Kauffman. The biological species definition is
being replaced by a type definition of Universes.
Hence, Smolin postulates that Black Holes, instead of representing singular
points of „physical breakdown“ in the Universe, serve as a sort of tunnel into the
early states of a novel Universe being actually produced by a „bouncing“
process under extremal conditions, mapping the micro-version of a „final sin-
gularity“ to the „initial singularity“ of a Universe coming to life. This is a con-
ception similar to Wormholes and/or Baby-Universes. The idea is then that the
production of Universes is such that those with a high production rate of Black
Holes (and thus of novel Universes) are selected. Consequently, Smolin speaks
of a theory of „cosmological natural selection“. ([26], pp.88, 96, 108; [41]) Al-
though this approach is not free of misunderstanding and drawback (I have
discussed this in some detail in [26], second reference), its advantage is first, the
utilization of aspects of Waddington’s „fitness landscape“ deriving primarily
from the „galactic ecology“ of interstellar matter, and second, its compatibility
with the principles of self-organized criticality. ([26], pp.159, 168-171) This also
sheds some more light onto the position which life itself is taking within this
picture: „Life perhaps might be seen to have evolved a way to ride these flows
and cycles [of self-organized criticality] the way a surfer rides the flow of ener-
gy in water waves.“ ([26], p.154sq.)
In the meantime, it has been shown that there are new arguments in favour of a
biological analogue to selection: Patel has argued that the relevance of Grover’s
search algorithm for the information processing in genetic DNA reveals that life
has taken the route of digitalizing its information. [44] Based on this, Zizzi as-
sumes that the observation probability of a state, when applying amplitudes in
the quantum algorithm approach, can be related to a similar value which is valid
for the early Universe, provided a suitable de Sitter model is being chosen. [45]
This also sheds some more light on the question whether it would be useful to
generalize the concepts of life and/or consciousness with a view to their univer-
sal role within the world:
The point is here that these concepts fall under the „rule of generality“: That is,
if we assume that the Universe altogether is a living entity, then finally, we end
up with having no reasonable meaning left for the concept of life. (If everything
is life, nothing is.) If, on the contrary, we would like to save the differentiating
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function of the concept, we cannot possibly implant life and/or consciousness
(as we know it) on the quantum level of the consideration. This is mainly so,
because the concepts we utilize (by means of our language) can be shown to be
emergent concepts. If so, thinking itself is emergent, and so is consciousness,
and finally, life altogether. On the other hand, the necessary conditions for
eventually having life at all, have to be intrinsic conditions of the process itself.
From what we have discussed before, we know already that „process“ carries a
model connotation only rather than being of ontological significance. Hence,
what we do is to utilize concepts of life and consciousness in order to symbolize
the self-reference we experience when producing models of the world such that
each model contains at least one self-model. But because there is not really a
process, the underlying correlate of what we call life (or consciousness) must be
actually present on the truly fundamental level all the time. We can call this cor-
relate „proto-consciousness“ (or „proto-life“ as for that), but we cannot overco-
me its merely epistemological connotation in really ontological terms. And this
will be the starting point for the second part of this present paper.
Preliminary Conclusion
What we have found out so far is that, so long as we stay within the field of phy-
sics proper, presently available models of loop quantum gravity are able to pro-
vide for a theoretical basis to eventually re-construct the evolution of the world
in terms of some theory of emergence, mediating the world as it is being obser-
ved with its foundation. Given certain ontological qualifications, this approach
turns out as a suitable case study for actually differentiating between world and
foundation in scientific terms. At the same time however, it becomes quite clear
that until now, this significant difference has not yet been topic of physical theo-
ry. Hence, the concept of „fundamental“ has to rephrased somewhat; and the
heuristic implications of its new utilization have to be discussed in some detail.
This is where modern philosophy comes in. Contrary to the sciences which take
a specialized perspective as to their respective field, philosophy tries to achieve
a reasonable totalization of all the scientific fields. In this sense, it is generalistic
rather than specialistic. Only the totalization of the world, not the mere summing
of all its specialized perspectives, can relate it properly to its foundation. And it
is only this relationship which can serve as a universal framework of orientation
for our wordly existence.
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